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NOTES
THE CLIPPER CHIP PROPOSAL:
DECIPHERING THE UNFOUNDED FEARS
THAT ARE WRONGFULLY DERAILING ITS
IMPLEMENTATION
INTRODUCTION

Improvements in technology have reduced law enforcement's
ability to conduct electronic surveillance of criminal activity.'
Rather than rely on telephones to communicate with their accomplices, criminals may increasingly use computers to perpetrate
crimes.2 In response to these problems, law enforcement authorities have pushed for the implementation of new methods to improve the ability of law enforcement agencies to intercept criminal
transmissions, while concurrently increasing the privacy of individual citizens.3
The "Clipper Chip" was developed to address this objective.4 This device is intended to alleviate law enforcement's reduced ability to conduct electronic surveillance by allowing government authorities, using proper methods, to intercept criminal
transmissions.5 As planned, the Clipper Chip will achieve this by
providing a mechanism for government authorities to decode encrypted communications using so-called "key escrow" technology.6

1. See David M. Boyhan, Cryptology to the Rescue; Codes and Cyphers Calm
Security Fears, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 9, 1993, at 5. See infra notes 22-28 and accompanying text for a discussion of the concerns of law enforcement and government authorities about the effects of improvements in encryption technology.
2. John Markoff, New Federal Electronic Privacy Policy Seen, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL., Apr. 16, 1993, at 2 [hereinafter referred to as New Federal].
3. Id.
4. Boyhan, supra note 1, at 5. In addition to other reasons, government engineers developed the Clipper Chip to prevent criminals from using advanced encryption technology to conceal their illegal activities and to provide private citizens
with privacy. Id.
5. Government Issues Guidelines For Encryption Devices, ELEC. MESSAGING
NEWS, Feb. 16, 1994, at 4 [hereinafter Government Issues]. Law enforcement
groups believe that it could more readily conduct electronic surveillance of criminals with the Clipper Chip. See infra notes 22-29 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the reasons given by government authorities for the development of
the Clipper Chip.
6. See infra notes 12-21 and accompanying text for a discussion of encryption
and infra notes 35-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of key encryption
technology.
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Furthermore, to implement this plan, the United States government plans to create a de facto standard using its purchasing
power, enacting legislation which "encourages" telecommunication
device vendors to include the Clipper Chip in their products and
by enforcing export restrictions on encryption technology. 7
There are conflicting reports on whether the Clinton Administration currently intends to proceed with the Clipper Chip proposal.' The Clinton Administration has affirmatively stated that
it is considering alternatives to the Clipper Chip.9 However, assuming the Clinton Administration decides to fully proceed with
the Clipper Chip proposal, constitutional and statutory provisions
exist to protect citizens from intrusions into their private communications. The Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures applies to private communications
which take place under a reasonable expectation of privacy. The
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Title III)
codifies the Supreme Court's interpretation of this provision and
provides federal statutory protection for oral, wire and electronic
communications by providing express requirements by which
government authorities may intercept private communications for
law enforcement purposes.
However, some groups believe that placing the ability to
decode encrypted information in the hands of the government will
enable authorities to circumvent these constitutional and federal
statutory protections.1 ° The fear is that the government will
abuse the Clipper Chip and conduct unreasonable searches and
seizures." Nonetheless, these fears are unfounded if Title III ap-

7. See infra notes 44-66 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
government's intent to create a de facto encryption standard.
8. Some reports have stated that the Clipper Chip proposal is still in limbo or
on the drawing board. Penny Bender, FBI Director May Finally Get High-Tech
Snooping Devices, GANNETr NEWS SERV., May 10, 1995, at Al. Other reports have
stated the opposite and claim that the Clipper Chip proposal was abandoned in
1994. Michelle Quinn, Decoder Policy Opposed, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 8, 1995, at B2.
9. John Markoff, U.S. to Urge a New Policy on Software, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18,
1995, at D1.
10. Lance J. Hoffman, et al., Cryptography: Policy and Technology Trends, Dec.
1, 1993, available in INTERNET, Address gopher: httpJ/www.vortex.comJ privacy/crypt-plcy.l.z. (discussing encryption technology, market analysis of encryption
technology, export controls and public policy issues). See also Comments of the
Electronic Frontier Foundation, Testimony before the Computer System Security
and Privacy Advisory Board (May 27, 1993). Such groups include the Electronic
Frontier Foundation (EFF) and the Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR). Id.; see also New Federal,supra note 2, at 2 (stating that "[p]eople won't
be able to trust these devices because there is a high risk that the government is
going to have complete access to anything they are going to do."). See infra notes
130-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of the concerns of these groups
regarding the Clipper Chip.
11. Edmund L. Andrews, FederalAgencies Get Ok for High-Tech Wire Taps, S.F.
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plies to encrypted communications emanating from devices containing the Clipper Chip. Therefore, the government should not
abandon the Clipper Chip proposal.
This Note examines the potential effects of the Clipper Chip
if the United States Government decides to implement the Clipper
Chip and the ramifications of this action for users of devices containing the chip. Part I presents the government's arguments for
implementing the Clipper Chip and the manner in which the
United States government intends to make it the de facto standard for encryption technology. Part II discusses the currently
applicable constitutional analysis which applies to electronic surveillance. Part III analyzes Title III of the Federal Wiretapping
Statute. Part III also examines the objections of civil libertarians
to the implementation of the Clipper Chip and suggests that their
fears that the device will allow the government to circumvent
Constitutional and statutory protections for private communications are unfounded. Finally, Part IV discusses the current alternatives to the Clipper Chip.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CLIPPER CHIP
A.

Encryption

Encryption, also known as cryptography, is the art of scrambling and unscrambling voice or data transmissions.1 2 Encryption allows the transmission of communications among users so
that only the intended recipients are privy to the contents of a
message. 3 Encryption has many common uses in society that
may not be familiar to the private citizen. Among other things,

encryption protects business records from unauthorized access,

4

CHRON., Feb. 5, 1994, at Al. Privacy rights groups believe that an implemented
Clipper Chip could lead to unauthorized eavesdropping because the decoder keys
are in the hands of the government. Id. See infra notes 131-32 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the concerns regarding increased incidence of unreasonable
searches and seizures with the implementation of the Clipper Chip in telecommunications devices.
12. Sensitive Information Could Be Regulated By Government (CNN television
Broadcast, June 2, 1993). The art of encryption is as old as the alphabet. Barry D.
Bayer & Benjamin H. Cohen, E-mail and Privacy - Keeping Confidential E-mail
Confidential, LAW OFF. TECH. REV., Feb. 22, 1994, at Al. A common type of encryption is the private key. Id. In each communication, a private key replaces each
letter in a message with a substitute. Id. The other party will reverse the substitution to decrypt the message. Id. The encrypted message will be secure as long as
no one else has that key. Id.
13. For example, User 1 sends the message: "Hello, my name is President
Clinton." When encrypted the transmission might look something like this
"xtr378 9gndki ehsdjk dsio3j38jjk8" and would sound like static in a voice transmission. However, User 2 has access to the encryption code and will be able to
decode and understand its message.
14. John Schwartz, The Software Security 'Threat' U.S. Fears Foreign Use Of
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protects the personal information of bank customers who use
automatic teller machines15 and scrambles the video signals of
cable television companies.' 6 Moreover, as technology becomes
more advanced, so does the sophistication and availability of encryption technology.' 7 Therefore, it is logical to conclude that additional uses for encryption will arise in the future.
Today, encryption techniques, most commonly contained in
computer software, scramble voice or data transmissions"8 into
digital bits from the sender and unscramble the transmission for
the receiver. 9 An eavesdropper attempting to intercept the message will only hear static or read nonsense unless that eavesdropper has the "key" or decoder allowing the unscrambling of digital
bits. Numerous encryption technologies are in use today, but some
of the more effective ones are Rivest, Shamir and Adelman
(RSA)2 ° and Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)21 systems.

Encryption Features, WASH. POST, June 18, 1994, at Al [hereinafter Software Security]. For example, a company can send an encrypted business plan on a disc
through the mail or over a digitized line on an electronic network without the fear
that a competitor could read the message in the event it was somehow intercepted.

Id.
15. Eric Hirschhorn & David Peyton, Uncle Sam's Secret Decoder Ring, WASH.
POST, June 25, 1992, at A23. Many banks and other institutions rely on encryption
to maintain the confidentiality of communications involving financial and other
business transactions. Ivars Peterson, Encrypting Controversy, 143 Sci. NEWS 394,
at 395.
16. Hirschhorn & Peyton, supra note 15, at A23. In addition, physicians rely on
encryption to protect patient files and businesses use it to keep employees records

secret. Id.
17. See generally Charles L. Evans, U.S. Export Controls of Encryption Software: Efforts to Protect National Security Threaten the U.S. Software Industry's
Ability to Compete in Foreign Markets, 19 N.C. J. INT'L LAW & COM. REGUL. 469
(1994).
18. New Federal,supra note 2, at 2. The encryption technology scrambling the
transmission into digital bits may be so strong that even the National Security
Agency's code breaking computers cannot unscramble the message. Id. Computer
hardware and software can encrypt phone conversations and computer data. Id.
Computer experts expect the number of individuals encrypting their communications will grow into wireless networks. Id. This will occur as a result of the nation's
commerce shifting to this form of business. Id. Encryption is especially needed on
these networks because they are particularly subject to eavesdropping. Id.
19. Peterson, supra note 15, at 394. See also Evans, supra note 17, at 472. Encryption devices are based on the science cryptography. Id. Two primary encryption systems are in use today: a single key system and a two key system. Id. A
single key system encrypts and decrypts data using the same key. Id. The Data
Encryption Standard (DES) uses the single key. Id. DES has a 56 bit key length,
which gives 70 quadrillion possible key combinations. Id. A two key system uses a
pair of keys to encrypt and decrypt data. Id. The public-key system is a common
two-key system. Id. In this system, a public key is available to everyone, and a
secret key is known only to its owner. Id. The possible key combinations equal an
approximately 200 digit number. Id.
20. Hoffman et al., supra note 10, at 6. RSA is named after its inventors Rivest,
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B. The Effect of Readily Available Encryption Technology
Presently, anyone can obtain encryption devices for voice or
data transmissions.22 Unfortunately, this group may include
criminals, terrorists and drug dealers. 23 Law enforcement groups
believe this could soon create a devastating problem because these
authorities commonly rely on electronic surveillance, also known
as "wiretapping," as a tool for fighting crime. That is, if criminals
can use advanced encryption technology in their transmissions,
electronic surveillance techniques could be rendered useless because of law enforcement's inability to decode the message.24 As
a result, computers and telecommunications systems may become
safe havens for all groups of criminals, thus allowing illegal activity to increase while decreasing the ability of law enforcement to
combat the crime.25
Furthermore, the increasing reliance of government agencies
on public computer networks also presents legitimate security
issues. For example, over ninety-five percent of the military's
communications are routed through the same telephone network
that private citizens use daily. 26 These communications include
the designing of weapons, the guiding of missiles, the managing of
medical supplies, the mobilization of reservists and the relaying of
battle tactics to combat commanders.27 Consequently, the military contends that maintaining the security of these transmissions is necessary and argues that the need for improved encryption techniques is vital to national security. 2 Thus, a need clearly exists to assure that this information is kept out of the "wrong
hands," while assuring that the necessary authorities maintain

Shamir and Adelman and is the most popular public-key algorithm. Id. It is based
on the theory that multiplying the private-key and public-key bits produces a
prime number that is extremely difficult to break. Id. Devices with RSA encryption
are available domestically and abroad. Id.
21. Id. PGP is the acronym for Pretty Good Privacy. Id. A cryptographer named
Philip Zimmerman developed this technology in response to the unavailability of
free, strong, encryption technology. Id. PGP is a public-key system, originally
based on RSA, but now combines the International Data Encryption Algorithm
(IDEA) and the DES algorithm. Id. PGP multiplies private-key and public-key bits
to produce a sirong algorithm virtually uncrackable. Id.
22. Boyhan, supra note 1, at 5.
23. Id.
24. New Federal,supra note 2, at 2.
25. Id.
26. Neil Munro, The Pentagon's New Nightmare: An Electronic Pearl Harbor,
WASH. POST, July 16, 1995, at C3.
27. Id. In addition, the military's communications include paying of soldiers,
training tank crews, issuing press releases, controlling radio networks and finding
spare parts. Id.
28. Id.
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necessary access.
C. The Clinton Administration'sResponse to the Problem
The concerns of law enforcement and government security
have not gone unheeded; rather, the United States Government
has reacted swiftly to concerns about the rapid advance of encryption technology in the private sector. In April 1993, the Clinton
Administration proposed the "Clipper Chip Initiative" in an attempt to address the concerns of law enforcement and to maintain
the security of confidential government communications.2 9
The Clipper Chip is a relatively inexpensive piece of hardware, costing approximately twenty-five dollars each in lots of
31
30
The chip uses a classified "Skipjack algorithm"
10,000.
which is sixteen million times more effective 32 than the currently
used Data Encryption Standard (DES).33 Each chip will have a

29. Hoffman et al., supra note 10, at 6. The stated objective of the Initiative is
to: "involve the creation of new products to accelerate the development and use of
advanced and secure telecommunications networks and wireless communication
links." Id. What ultimately became the Initiative actually began during the Bush
Administration. Bruce Schneier, Clipper Gives Big Brother Far Too Much Power,
COMPUTERWORLD, May 31, 1993, at 33. The proposal under the Initiative was developed jointly by the National Security Agency and the National Institute of Standards and Technology. Frederick Cooper III, Clipper Chip: Does Proposal Violate
ConstitutionalRights? - Privacy vs. Security, COMPUTER RESELLER NEWS, Mar.
28, 1994, at 79.
30. Jube Shriver Jr., Tapping into High-Tech Device Ok'd to Help Feds Monitor
Computer - Encoded Calls, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1993, at Dl.
31. Peterson, supra note 15, at 394. An algorithm is a mathematical recipe. Id.
at 395. The Clipper Chip uses a classified algorithm called skipjack which is intended to replace the DES (Data Encryption Standard) as the national standard
encryption device. Clipper Chip and Capstone, COMPUTER FRAUD & SEC. BULL.,
Sept. 1993. See supra notes 12-21 and accompanying text for a discussion of some
encryption standards in use today.
32. In Brief Clipper Chip, DOJ ALERT, June 6, 1994, at 10. Unless the National
Security Agency grants someone permission, no one is allowed to test the Clipper
Chip to determine its strength and security. Robert L. Hotz, Computer Code's Security Worries Privacy Watchdogs, L.A. TIMES, Oct.4, 1993, at Al. To test the chip,
the NSA retained five cryptography experts to test the Clipper Chip's strength. Id.
However, these experts were prohibited from discussing their conclusions except in
the most general terms. Id. One of the experts, Dorothy Denning, has enthusiastically endorsed the Clipper Chip. Dorothy Denning (U.S.A.), INTELLIGENCE NEWSL.,
Oct. 14, 1993, at 226.
33. Hoffman et al., supra note 10, at 1. The International Business Machines
Corporation (IBM) developed DES and released it to the public in 1977. Id. DES is
based on a strong private-key encryption algorithm. Id. DES contains a 56-bit key
as compared to the Clipper Chip's 80-bit key. Id. The algorithm becomes more
effective as the number of bits in a key increases. Id. In 1993, the National Institute for Standards and Technology recertified DES as the national standard until
1998. Id. However, scientists contend that advanced and powerful computers may
possibly break DES by attempting every possible combination of keys until the
correct key is discovered. Id. Thus, DES may not be secure for very long. Id.
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"master key" that can decode an encrypted message and allow the
key holder to read the message.34 Thus, when necessary, the government will be able to access information that it would otherwise
not be able to read.
Cognizant of the fact that some may object to the ability of
the government to access private information, the Administration
35
has also attempted to balance the privacy concerns of citizens.
To ensure that government authorities will not circumvent established procedures which now exist to protect citizens against indiscriminate intrusion by authorities into private communications,
the government proposes to maintain a copy of the encryption
"key" and divide it into two parts.36 When these two parts are
used simultaneously, they will unlock an encrypted message and
allow decoding and reading of the message.3 7
To further decrease the possibility that communications will
be intercepted, the Administration plans to designate two different agencies, the Treasury Department and the Commerce Department, as trustees of the "keys."38 Only upon the issuance of a
court order will those agencies release their "keys" and allow law
enforcement to successfully decrypt a message.39 This system is

In contrast, the Clipper Chip is 24 bits longer than the DES's 56 bit key. Id.
The interim report on the skipjack algorithm stated that it would take approximately 30-40 years to break Skipjack, but with the advances in technology, 12-18
years is more accurate. Id.
A comparison of the two codes:
DES
Skipjack
Designer
IBM
NSA
Year Introduced
1976 1993
Formula
Public Classified
Law Enforcement access
No
Yes
Key Chosen By
User
Government
Number of Keys
One
Two
Hotz, supra note 32, at Al.
34. Peterson, supra note 15, at 395. This key will be made at the time the chip
is produced. Id. It will also be deposited into two separate databases. Id. The
Clinton administration's "key escrow" system differs from the public key system.
David Post, Encryption vs The Alligator Clip, AM. LAW., Jan./Feb. 1995, at 111.
Instead of the public knowing one of the keys, the government retains both "keys"
that can unscramble encrypted files. Id. See supra notes 12-21 and accompanying
text for a discussion of encryption devices.
35. See infra notes 131-32 and accompanying text for a discussion of public concerns about implementation of the Clipper Chip in telecommunications devices.
36. Peterson, supra note 15, at 395.
37. Id.
38. Clipper Chip, 1994: Testimony Before the House of Representatives Committee on Science, Space & Technology, subcommittee on Technology, Environment and
Aviation (May 3, 1994) (statement of Raymond G. Kammer) (transcript available in
Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony).
39. Peterson, supra note 15, at 395. However, many civil rights groups are fearful that the court order requirement will be bypassed in some situations or that it
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now called "key escrow.
The Clipper Chip would increase the ability of the government to pre-empt any threat to either law enforcement or government security because it would allow the decoding of encrypted
communications without detection.41 That is, the Clipper Chip
has a 'back door' which would allow law enforcement to decode encrypted messages without the knowledge of either the sender and
receiver.4 2 Nonetheless, the proposed procedure to decode the
messages calls for a court order prior to taking any action.43
D. Creation of a DeFacto Standard

Although the Clinton Administration contends that it does
not intend to ban the use of all currently available encryption
technology, evidence exists that the government intends to make
the Clipper Chip the only legal standard.4 4 That is, while the
Administration claims that implementation of the Clipper Chip
would be voluntary,45 the government is attempting to create a
de facto encryption standard through its purchasing power, enactment of legislation and export controls.
1. The Government's Coercive PurchasingPower

The federal government hopes to saturate the American teleis inevitable an unauthorized person will get a copy of the keys. Nina Schuyler,
Bugs in the System, CAL. LAW., July 1994, at 47. See infra notes 131-32 and accompanying text for a further discussion of the concerns of some groups and infra
notes 102-30 and accompanying text for a discussion of the constitutional requirements for government access to private communications.
40. G. Burgess Allison, Technology Update, A.B.A. L. PRAC. MGMT., May/June
1994, at 14. The government now officially refers to the Clipper Chip as "key escrow." Id.
41. Software Security, supra note 14, at Al.
42. Bernard P. Zajac, Jr., AT&T Aligns with VLSI for Cryptography Chips,
COMPUTER FRAUD & SEC. BULL., Apr. 1995, at A7. Whitfield Diffie, a respected
cryptographer, describes the "key escrow" system in simplistic terms:
[v]ery much like ... the little keyhole in the back of the combination locks
used on the lockers of school children. The children open the locks with the
combinations, which is supposed to keep the other children out, but the
teachers can always look in the lockers by using the key.
John Mintz & John Schwartz, Chipping Away at Privacy?; Encryption Device Widens Debate Over Rights of U.S. to Eavesdrop, WASH. POST, May 30, 1993, at H1
[hereinafter Chipping Away].
43. Zajac, supra note 42, at A7. See infra notes 108-19 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the methods for government authorities to obtain approval for
interception of communications.
44. Peterson, supra note 15, at 395.
45. John Markoff, GuardingPrivacy in Cyberspace FederalEavesdroppingPlan
Fraught, STAR TRIB., Feb. 20, 1994, at A24. Michael Nelson, an administration official in charge of technology policy, stated that the government does not intend to
require the use of the Clipper Chip as mandatory. Id.
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communications and computer market with the Clipper Chip.46
In an attempt to create a de facto standard in this manner, the
National Institute of Standards and Technology began by strongly
encouraging federal agencies to require placement of the Clipper
Chip in the equipment they purchase from vendors. 7 For example, in early 1994, the government issued an order to federal
agencies requiring the use of the Clipper Chip for unclassified
communications including voice, fax and low-speed modem transmissions." As a result, the government will require that all suppliers, as well as anyone who transacts business with these agencies, to include the Clipper Chip in their products.49 Since redesign of products to exclude the Clipper Chip may not be cost effective, it is possible that virtually all communications devices will
include the Clipper Chip, in effect creating a de facto encryption
standard.5 ° Additionally, the National Security Agency has proposed implementing the Clipper Chip outside the realm of government operations by installing it in every domestic telephone, computer modem and fax machine sold to the public.5 1

46. John Schwartz, Chopping Away at the Fundamental Freedom? Computer
Firms, Rights Groups Clash with the White House Over Encryption vs. Law Enforcement, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 1993, at Hi.
47. Andrews, supra note 11, at Al.
48. Zajac, supra note 42, at A7.
49. Id.
50. Andrews, supra note 11, at Al. Behind this concept lies a simple domino
theory. Id. Eventually all governmental departments and agencies will use the
Clipper Chip. It is then expected to spread to anyone who deals with the government. Id. There are many people and companies who communicate with the government, thus the government hopes the Clipper Chip spreads until eventually a
de facto encryption standard exists. Id. Manufacturers failing to adopt the Clipper
Chip would be unable to sell computer hardware and software in the lucrative
federal market and could expect difficulty in obtaining export licenses. John
Markoff, Big Brother And The Computer Age, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1993, at Dl
[hereinafter Big Brother]. The government is attempting to establish a de facto encryption standard. Id. It will accomplish this by requiring governmental agencies
to only purchase devices that incorporate the Clipper Chip. Post, supra note 34, at
111. Id.
It is possible that the Clipper Chip initiative is already underway; to date the
government has purchased more than 17,000 Clipper Chips. Kevin Power, NIST to
Run Field Test of the Clipper Chip This Fall, GOVT. COMPUTER NEWS, July 3, 1995,
at 60. The government has also purchased approximately 30,000 Capstone Chips
- the sister chip to the Clipper Chip. Id. The Clipper Chip encrypts low speed
data and voice transmissions and the Capstone Chip encrypts high speed transmissions. Hotz, supra note 32, at Al.
51. Jim Young, The Information Highway to Hell; Threat Against the Right to
Privacy; From the Editors; Editorial,PULP & PAPER, June 1994, at 9. The National
Institute of Science and Technology, Bell Atlantic and General Instruments Corp.
have agreed to place the Clipper Chip in General Instruments' cable-television
boxes. Id. The Clipper Chip may also be placed in SmartCards. Id. SmartCards are
databases with health and financial information the size of a typical credit card.
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While the Administration claims otherwise, this proposal
appears contrary to a voluntary implementation of the device in
telecommunications equipment. In fact, in 1993 the FBI recommended mandatory use of the Clipper Chip. 2 President Clinton
apparently agrees with this proposal, as Administration sources
stated that President Clinton may propose legislation requiring
the use of its "key escrow" encryption technology and banning the
use of any other strong encryption technology that is not compatible with the Clipper Chip.53 While such legislation is as yet not
in place, Congress has already passed legislation responding to
the advance of encryption technology.
2. The Legislative Response to Advanced Encryption Technology
In October, 1994, Congress enacted the Communications
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (commonly referred to as the
"Digital Telephony Bill") to assist the FBI in wiretapping digital
communications.5 4 Congress enacted this legislation in recognition of the potential ineffectiveness of wiretapping due to the
proliferation of advanced technology.5 5 The Digital Telephony
Bill requires a "telecommunications carrier"" to guarantee to the
government that it has the capability, pursuant to a court order,
to provide the government "call identifying information" 57 at a lo-

52. FBI Documents - Clipper Must be Mandatory, NEWSBYTEs NEWS NETWORK,
Aug. 23, 1995.
53. Chipping Away, supra note 42, at H1. Bill Frezza of Ericssa-G.E. Mobile
Data Inc. said, "[t]he genie is already out of the bottle." Id. He was insinuating
that the government will be unable to limit the spread on encryption even if there
is a de facto standard. Id. Responding to this possibility, "[a]dministration sources
said if the current plan doesn't enable the NSA and FBI to keep on top of the technology, then Clinton is prepared to introduce legislation to require use of its encryption technology, which is crackable by the NSA, and to ban use of the
uncrackable gear." Id.
54. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-414, 108 STAT. 4279 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1029, 2510, 2511, 2516, 2518,
2522, 2701, 3121, 3124; 47 U.S.C. §§ 154, 155, 157 to 159, 212 to 214, 220, 222 to
224, 226 to 229, 303b(a), 308, 309, 318, 328, 331, 356, 381 to 386, 410, 413, 533,
544, 554, 604, 605, 610, 612, 613, 701 note, 721, 731 to 734, 744, 751, 752, 1001,
1001 note, 1002 to 1011 (1994)).
55. See Jaleen Nelson, Note, Sledge Hammers and Scalpels: The FBI Digital
Wiretap Bill and It's Effect on Free Flow of Information and Privacy, 41 UCLA L.
REV. 1139, 1139 n.1 (1994) (discussing the FBI proposed legislation to the second
session of the 102nd Congress (the Digital Telephony Bill) and its possible constitutional ramifications).
56. The term "telecommunications carrier" is defined as a person or entity engaged in the business of transmitting or switching wire or electronic communications. 47 U.S.C. § 1001(8).
57. The term "call identifying information" is defined as the dialing or signaling
information that identifies the origin, direction, destination, or termination of a
communication by a customer of a telecommunications carrier. 47 U.S.C. § 1001(2).
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cation other than the premises of the carrier. 8 For example, if a
law enforcement agency possessed a court order for a wiretap, this
legislation would require a company like AT&T to provide to that
agency, at any remote location, the origin, destination and time of
termination of the telephone call targeted. Moreover, Congress
has authorized substantial funding for this legislation, which
signifies that it is serious about its enactment.59
This legislation demonstrates Congress' desire to deal with
the advance of encryption technology and the problems it may
cause for law enforcement officials. However, as a result, the Clipper Chip might become an attractive option to telecommunications
carriers because the companies can adopt it in their products as a
ready-made method in which to comply with the Digital Telephony Bill. That is, the Clipper Chip already contains a "back door"
for law enforcement since, under the key escrow system, government agencies already hold the means by which to access encrypted communications. 6 ° The government may hope this attractiveness will help to institute the Clipper Chip as a de facto encryption standard for the telecommunications industry. Export controls on encryption technology also serve as a means by which the
government can push telecommunications companies toward use
of the Clipper Chip.
3. Export Controls on Encryption Technology
Highly secret government communications are constantly
transmitted over public computer networks. 6' Additionally, the
United States government considers encryption technology in the
62
possession of foreign countries a threat to national security.
Accordingly, the Department of Defense classifies encryption software as "Munitions" under the Arms Export Control Act and subjects the software to strict export controls.6 3 Under this legislation, encryption technology is treated as vital to national security and a distributor must thus obtain an export license from the

58. Information Superhighway: An Overview Of Technology Challenges, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT 1 (1995).

59. Id. Congress apportioned $500 million to implement this program and authorized the reimbursement of reasonable costs to the telecommunications carrier.
Id.
60. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of key escrow
technology.
61. See Munro, supra note 26, at C3.
62. Evans, supra note 17, at 469. The government fears that if advanced encryption technology falls into the hands of enemies of the United States the technology could become a threat to this country's national security. Id.
63. See Arms Export Control Act § 38, 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1988). Some other
items listed on the Munitions List are: bombs, grenades, ballistic missiles, tanks,
military aircraft and others. Id.
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State 64Department before exporting encryption hardware or software.

However, the Clinton administration has relaxed the licensing process for products exported with the Clipper Chip. 5 The
apparent hope is that these relaxed standards will increase the
use of the Clipper Chip by U.S. companies.66 Any such increased
usage will likely increase the success of the government's attempts to create a de facto standard both in the United States and
possibly abroad.
The combined effect of the government's purchasing power,
the enactment of the Digital Telephony Bill and export restrictions on encryption technology other than the Clipper Chip will
likely effect the dynamics of a national encryption standard. The
government is using these three mechanisms in an attempt to
create a de facto encryption standard - the Clipper Chip. Implementation of this plan will certainly alleviate some concern about
the use of encryption technology by criminals to circumvent discovery, as well as the concern that unauthorized people will obtain confidential government information. However, some groups
fear that the government will abuse the Clipper Chip to unreasonably invade individual privacy or conduct warrantless searches
and seizures. Before the concerns of these groups are addressed, a
background discussion of the constitutional and statutory safeguards which protect personal communications from indiscriminate government intrusion is necessary.
II.

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND ITS REQUIREMENTS FOR
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

This Section discusses the application of the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures in the

64. Evans, supra note 17, at 481-82. However, some argue that in the fast
paced world of technology, U.S. exporters of software operate at a disadvantage
relative to other software exporting nations because the Arms Control Export Act
limits the type of encryption that may be utilized in a program, often resulting in a
weaker and less desirable type being included. Id. at 481-82. Other countries which
possess advanced encryption technology include: Germany, France, Switzerland
and the United Kingdom. Id.
65. Gore Says Administration Will Work With Industry On Encryption Standard, DAILY REP. FOR ExEc., July 22, 1994, at A19. Under current export
standards, companies can export any technology using the Clipper Chip. Id. However, before they can export other encryption technologies, companies must continue to go through the rigors of the licensing process. Id.
66. Nonetheless, the software industry is hesitant to export products with the
Clipper Chip. Chipping Away, supra note 42, at H1. The Clipper Chip would be
hard to sell in foreign markets because of fears that the United States Government
would spy on users. Id. As a result, industry is hesitant to export the Clipper Chip.
Id.
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context of electronic surveillance by government authorities. This
Section will address the Supreme Court decisions in Olmstead,67
Katz6" and Berger,6 cases which laid forth the standard that
electronic surveillance of wire and oral communications must
satisfy under the Fourth Amendment.
The Fourth Amendment guarantees citizens security against
unreasonable searches and seizures by government authorities. °
As interpreted by the courts, the provision limits law
enforcement's power to conduct a search and seizure on private
citizens. 7 ' Thus, in order for a law enforcement officer to conduct
a search or seizure, he must obtain a warrant only after making a
showing of probable cause and particularly describing the purpose
of the warrant. 72 Evidence obtained violating the Fourth Amendment must be excluded from trials.7 3 This exclusionary rule applies to telephone surveillance.
Telephone surveillance, or "wiretapping," by government
authorities began in the early part of this century. The Supreme
Court first examined telephone wiretaps in Olmstead v. United
States.74 In this case, law enforcement agents wiretapped the
defendant's telephone line away from the defendant's property.7"
The Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to oral
conversations over phone lines and, thus, that wiretapping by
government authorities was constitutional. 76 The majority further held that the Fourth Amendment only applied to the person,

67. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
68. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
69. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
70. U.S. CONST. amend IV.The provision reads:
The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
Id.
However, the Fourth Amendment does not grant a general right to privacy. Katz,
389 U.S. at 350. Instead, it protects individual privacy from the government intrusion into private affairs. Id.
71. Katz, 389 U.S. at 347; Berger, 388 U.S. at 41.
72. U.S. CONST. amend IV.
73. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914). The exclusionary rule
bars evidence from being admitted in a trial and is a remedy for a violation of the
Fourth Amendment. Id.; see also Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251
U.S. 385, 394 (1920) (holding that evidence obtained violating the Fourth Amendment must be excluded from trial).
74. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
75. Id. at 457. The defendant unlawfully sold liquor violating the National Prohibition Act. Id. at 456. Federal officers wiretapped telephones outside the
defendant's home and office. Id.
76. Id. at 466.
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home, papers and property." Therefore, the Court determined
that no search or seizure occurred during the telephone surveillance because law enforcement did not enter the defendants property to execute the wiretap.78
However, Justice Brandeis vehemently dissented stating that
the Fourth Amendment should protect oral conversations to prevent law enforcement from obtaining unfettered access to private
telephone conversations. 79 The Supreme Court would later adopt
Justice Brandeis' reasoning in Katz v. United States8 ° and Berger
v. New York, s" thus establishing the modern day process law enforcement officials must follow to conduct an electronic surveillance.
In Katz, the Court found that the government conducted an
unreasonable search of the defendant. 2 Law enforcement officers
attached an electronic wiretapping device to a public telephone
booth to record the defendant's conversation. 3 The Court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment applies to people, not places,
thus expressly overruling Olmstead.' Therefore, the government
authorities cannot conduct a search or seizure without a warrant
if a person holds a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place
searched or things seized. 5 Accordingly, the Court stated that an
8
officer conducting a search or seizure must meet three criteria: 6
1) the officer must begin the search with probable cause; 87 2) the
officer must limit the search in scope and duration; 88 and 3) the
officer must make an effort to intercept only relevant transmissions. 89 Under this standard, the Court found that the Katz defendant held a reasonable expectation of privacy in his telephone
communication.9 0

77. Id. at 463.
78. Id. The Court reasoned that no search or seizure occurred because people
using telephones intend to communicate with people outside of their house. Id.
Thus, messages intercepted outside the physical boundaries of a person's house are
not within the scope of the Fourth Amendment. Id.
79. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 475 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis stated
in his famous dissent, "[tihe greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding." Id.
80. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
81. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
82. Katz, 389 U.S. at 359.
83. Id. at 348. The petitioner was convicted of transmitting wagering information in violation of a federal statute. Id. FBI agents recorded his illegal conversations outside a public telephone booth. Id.
84. Id. at 351, 353.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Katz, 389 U.S. at 354.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Katz's reasonable expectation arose
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Justice Harlan's concurrence set forth a two-prong test to
determine if a person holds a reasonable expectation of privacy in
his communication.9 First, the person must hold a subjective
expectation of privacy. 92 Second, a person's expectation of privacy
must be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. s3
This test remains the standard for determining whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy.9 4
In Berger, the Court invalidated a New York electronic surveillance statute based on the particularity clause,95 which requires a warrant with a specific scope of allowable search.96 The
Berger court clarified the requirements that an electronic surveillance statute must satisfy. Berger provides that a neutral and
detached authority may grant a wiretap if the request is based on
probable cause, particularly describes the places to be searched
and the things to be seized, has a limited duration and requires
the warrant be returned. 98
Together, Katz and Berger establish the criteria law enforcement must follow to conduct a valid electronic surveillance. 99

when he shut the door of the telephone booth and expected no one else to hear his
conversation. Id.
91. Id.
92. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361. A person must exhibit an actual subjective expectation of privacy. Id. Katz had a subjective expectation of privacy. Id. He shut the
telephone booth door and expected no on else to listen to his call. Id.
93. Id. A person's home is an example of a place where he or she expects privacy and would be recognized as objectively reasonable. Id. Katz had an objective
expectation of privacy. Id. Katz shut the telephone booth door and paid for a call.
Id. At that point, the telephone booth was not accessible to the public. Id. Therefore, once Katz shut the door, he had a reasonable expectation of privacy and it is
irrelevant that the booth was located in a public area. Id.
94. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39 (1988); California v. Ciraolo, 476
U.S. 207, 212 (1986); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 467 U.S. 227, 230 (1986);
Oliver v. Thornton, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S.
276, 280 (1983).
95. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59-60 (1967).
96. The particularity clause requires that a warrant specify the purpose and extent of the search to prevent the officer from using independent discretion. Marron
v. United States, 272 U.S. 192, 196 (1927); United States v. Crozier, 777 F.2d 1376,
1380 (9th Cir. 1985).
97. See Berger, 388 U.S. at 59-60.
98. Id. The Court found five deficiencies in the New York statute. Id. First, the
statute did not require law enforcement to particularly describe the conversation to
be overheard. Id. Second, the statute allowed the wiretap to stay in place for up to
60 days without a new showing of probable cause. Id. Third, the warrant could be
renewed without probable cause if it was in the public's best interest. Id. Fourth,
the authority for the tap did not cease to exist after the intended conversation was
overheard. Id. And fifth, there was no return of the warrant to the court with the
results of the tap and the warrant upon expiration. Id.
99. See Mark I. Koffsky, Comment, Choppy Waters In The Surveillance Data
Stream: The Clipper Scheme And The ParticularityClause, 9 HIGH TECH. L.J. 131,
138 (1994) (discussing a hypothetical mandatory Clipper Chip and its effect on the
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Katz concentrates on whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched or things seized,'00 whereas, Berger dictates that an electronic surveillance statute must
limit the scope of each surveillance. 0 '
III. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS'S RESPONSE TO KATZ AND
BERGER: OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL AND SAFE STREETS ACT OF
1968 (TITLE

III)

In response to Katz and Berger, Congress enacted legislation
controlling oral and wire surveillance. This legislation, commonly
referred to as Title III, sets forth the statutory requirements that
federal authorities must follow in an electronic surveillance. This
Section details this legislation, and its 1986 amendment that
included electronic communications. Additionally, this Section sets
forth some cases interpreting this legislation.
A. The Requirements for a Valid Electronic Surveillance under
Title III
Title III was enacted as part of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968.102 As originally enacted, Title III
applied to the interception of wire and oral communications by
law enforcement officers.'0 3 Congress subsequently amended Ti-

Particularity Clause of the Fourth Amendment).
100. Id. at 138.
101. See United Statesv. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293, 1303 n.14 (8th Cir. 1972). The
court outlined the nine Berger requirements:
(1) that the applicant procure "[from] a neutral and detached authority,"
which Katz says must be a judicial officer, an order permitting the wiretap;
(2) that to procure the order, or renewal thereof, the applicant must show
probable cause that an offense has been or is being committed and must
state with particularity (3) the offense being investigated, (4) the place being
searched (i.e., the telephone being tapped or place being bugged), and (5) the
things (conversations) to be seized; (6) that the order must be executed with
dispatch; (7) that it must not continue beyond the procurement of the conversation sought and thereby become "a series of intrusions, searches, and
seizures pursuant to a single showing of probable cause;" (8) that it overcome the lack of notice by requiring a showing of exigent circumstances as a
precondition to the order; and (9) that it require a return on the warrant.
Id. The following sections of the federal electronic surveillance statute, Title III,
flow respectively from the above-enumerated criteria: (1) 18 U.S.C. § 2516; (2) §
2518(1)(f) & (2); (3) § 2518(1)(b)(i); (4) § 2518(1)(b)(iii), (4)(a) & (4)(b); (5) §
2518(1)(b)(iii) and (4)(c); (6) § 2518(6); (7) § 2518(1)(d), (4)(e) and (5); (8) §
2518(1)(c), (3)(c) & (8)(d); (9) § 2518(8)(a) & (8)(b). Id. See infra notes 102-30 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Title III.
102. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (1968).
103. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1). Wire communications denote any aural transfer made
with the aid of wire, cable or other such connections. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1). As used
in the Act, "aural transfer" means a transfer containing the human voice at any
point between the point of origin and reception. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(18).
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tle III to include electronic communication via the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA)." Title III accomplishes two
objectives. First, it protects an individual's privacy in oral, wire
and electronic communications." 5 Second, it establishes the cri0 6
teria for a valid interception by law enforcement authorities.
However, an overriding consideration of this is an attempt to balance the needs of law enforcement with the need to protect the
privacy of the individual.' 7
Under Title III, the Attorney General or a designated enforcement officer'0° may authorize an application to a federal judge
for an order allowing law enforcement to intercept an oral, wire or
electronic communication.0 9 Any such interception order must
contain several items to be valid. A judge must first determine
that based on the facts probable cause exists that an individual is
committing one of the enumerated offenses in § 2516 of Title
III."' Second, a belief must also exist based on probable
cause,"' that the surveillance will produce information about
that offense.1 2 Third, normal investigative procedures must
have failed or were too dangerous to conduct."' Fourth, the Attorney General or law enforcement officer must have probable
cause that the place under surveillance is connected with one of

104. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100
Stat. 1848 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1367 (1988)). The Act defines "electronic communications" as "any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images sounds, data, or
intelligence of any nature transmitted . . . by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectric or photo-optical system that affects interstate commerce .... " 18 U.S.C. §
2510(12).
105. Title I of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act addresses the
protections from interception of wire, oral and electronic communications. See S.
Rep. No. 541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555,
3568 (discussing the privacy afforded to various communications in an analysis of
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act).
106. Id. at 27-31. The Senate Report discusses applications, orders and the implementation of orders. Id.
107. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 130 (1978). See infra notes 120-26 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the Scott decision.
108. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) lists the positions that may authorize an application for
an intercept order. '[Tihe Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, Associate
Attorney General, or any Assistant Attorney General, any acting Assistant Attorney General or Deputy Assistant Attorney General, or acting Deputy Assistant
Attorney General in the Criminal Division specially designated by the Attorney
General." Id.
109. Id.
110. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a).
111. A probable cause determination for the issuance of a warrant is based on a
"totality-of-the circumstances" approach. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 225-39
(1983).
112. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(b).
113. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c).
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the enumerated offenses.1 4 In addition, each application must
identify the conversation to be intercepted," 5 the nature and location of the facility to be intercepted," 6 particularly describe
the type of communication to be intercepted" ' and identify the
agency and officer authorizing the surveillance"B and the length
of time for the interception." 9
Notwithstanding the above requirements, Title III contains a
safeguard provision which requires quick execution of interceptions otherwise authorized and limitation of the interception to
relevant communications. 20 This safeguard, referred to as the
minimization requirement, is concerned with the balancing interests between wiretapping and Fourth Amendment privacy interests. 2' The 1978 case of Scott v. United States 22 set the standard for this requirement.
In Scott, law enforcement agents wiretapped the defendant's
telephone. 12 However, only forty percent of all the recorded
calls related to illegal activity. 124 In finding that the authorities
did not violate the minimization requirement of Title III, the
Supreme Court held that the minimization safeguard must be
evaluated by an objective standard.'25 Nonetheless, the Court
qualified the opinion by stating that the circumstances under
which the telephone is used play an important part in the deter-

114. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(d).
115. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4)(a).
116. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4)(b).
117. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4)(c).
118. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4)(d). In United States v. Chavis, the Supreme Court held
that the identification requirement of the authorizing officer is not so critical to
Title III projections to require the exclusionary rule as a remedy of wrongful identity. 416 U.S. 562, 563 (1974).
119. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4)(e).
120. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5). The minimization requirement reads:
Every order and extension thereof shall contain a provision that the authorization to intercept shall be executed as soon as practicable, shall be conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of communications not
otherwise subject to interception under this chapter, and must terminate
upon attainment of the authorized objective, or in any event in thirty days.
Id.
121. Scott v. United States, 425 U.S. 917, 917-18 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari).
122. 436 U.S. 128, 130 (1978).
123. Id. at 130. Narcotics agents obtained a warrant to intercept the communications of a telephone for a period of one month. Id. at 130-31. The warrant contained a requirement to restrict the interceptions to those dealing with the alleged
illegal activity. Id. at 131-32.
124. Id. at 132. As such, the defendants attempted to have the evidence suppressed for failure to meet the minimization requirement. Id.
125. Id. at 137. However, Justice Brennan dissented alleging that to solely focus
on an objective standard does not satisfactorily protect privacy interests from unlimited government surveillance. Id. at 147 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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mination of whether the minimization requirement is
satisfied.126
The ECPA amended the minimization requirement of Title
III. The ECPA provides that law enforcement may postpone
minimization of a communication if the intercepted communication is in a foreign language or code and an expert is not reasonably available during the minimization period.' 27 In such a case,
minimization of the communication may be accomplished "as soon
as practicable" after the interception.'2 s
To date, law enforcement authorities seeking to uphold interceptions of communications in a foreign language or some type of
code have used this provision. 29 With the increase in the prevalence of electronic transmissions where the communication is
encrypted, this provision will very likely come into play on a more
frequent basis. That is, an encrypted communication whether by
telephone or by computer transmission is by definition
encrypted.'3 ° Nonetheless, government authorities seeking to obtain these transmissions will still be required to follow the requirements of Title III to gain initial permission to intercept the
communication. However, some civil libertarians believe law enforcement authorities will circumvent Title III requirements if the
Clipper Chip gains widespread use.
B. Will the Clipper Chip Allow the Government to Circumvent
the ProtectionsAfforded by Title III?
Under the Clipper Chip key escrow system, the federal government will have the ability to decode all communications using
this encryption technology.' 3 ' Since the sole means of decoding
these transmissions lies with government authorities, some believe that this control of the decoder keys may reduce the
protections afforded to private communications by Title III. As
such, civil libertarians believe that the government will be able to
indiscriminately intercept private communications emanating
from devices containing the Clipper Chip. Moreover, others fear
that since all communications obtained will be encrypted, there is

126. Id. at 140. For example, if law enforcement taps a public phone to monitor
an individual suspected of placing bets over the phone and listens to all calls regardless of who places the calls, there will be substantial doubts as to
minimization. Id. However, if a phone in a private residence of the head of a major
drug ring is tapped, a contrary conclusion may be inferred. Id.
127. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5).
128. Id.
129. United States v. London, 66 F.3d 1227, 1236-37 (lst Cir. 1995); United
States v. Gambino, 734 F. Supp. 1084, 1106 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
130. See supra notes 12-21 and accompanying text for a discussion of encryption.
131. See supra notes 29-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Clipper
Chip and the key escrow system.
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no way to minimize the intercepted communications as required
by Title III. This will allow law enforcement officials to access
private communications which have no relation to alleged criminal activity and will thus invade the privacy of users of Clipper
Chip containing devices. These fears are unfounded, however, as
protections afforded will apply equally to communications emanating from devices containing the Clipper Chip. The next Section
addresses these issues.
C. Title III Applies to the Clipper Chip
As discussed previously, one of Title III's objectives is to protect citizens from indiscriminate intrusions into their private
communications. In recent years, the nature of communication has
shifted from the traditional methods of telephones, mail and faceto-face interaction. Instead, computer technology has, in many
instances, replaced these methods for both business and personal
communications. 32 Nonetheless, the introduction of computers
as a medium is merely an extension of these more traditional
forms of communication. That is, use of computers or other forms
of digital devices still operate as a mechanism to communicate
with others. Congress realized as much when it enacted the ECPA
to apply Title III to electronic communications.
Moreover, the installation of the Clipper Chip into a telecommunications device does not alter a user's reasonable expectation
of privacy in the communication. To argue as much, one would
have to also propose that the knowledge that the mere fact that
the government could possibly intercept one's telephone calls by
means of a wiretap also results in a relinquishment of a person's
reasonable expectation of privacy. This conclusion makes no sense
considering that the express purpose of Title III is to assure that
law enforcement authorities do not violate a person's reasonable
expectation of privacy through unauthorized interception by wiretaps or other forms of interception. Under this reasoning, a person
using a device in which the Clipper Chip is installed possesses a
reasonable expectation that the communication
will remain pri133
vate and the protections of Title III apply.
The purpose of the Clipper Chip is not to intercept communications, but instead, to encrypt communications or decrypt information intercepted through judicially approved methods."M
Moreover, the requirements of Title III also apply to communications decrypted by the Clipper Chip, as such action constitutes a

132. S. Rep. No. 541, supra note 105, at 2.
133. Scott v. United States 436 U.S. 128, 134 (1978). See supra notes 120-26 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the Scott decision.
134. Software Security, supra note 14, at Al.
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means of interception as used in the Act. The statute defines the
term "intercept" to mean "the aural or other acquisition of the
contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication through
the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device."135
Decryption of electronic communications emanating from the
Clipper Chip containing telecommunications devices would probably fall under this definition because the term "other device" signifies that Congress did not intend for the enumerated methods to
be exclusive. Thus, courts will likely find that decryption of communications using the Clipper Chip is subject to the limitations of
Title III.
D. Title III will Protect Citizens from UnreasonableGovernment
Searches and Seizures
Since Title III applies to communications emanating from
devices containing the Clipper Chip, the government must follow
particular requirements to conduct a valid electronic surveillance.
Thus, in order to intercept such communications, including telephone or data transmissions such as computer e-mail,' 36 the
government would be required to obtain a warrant based upon
probable cause that the targeted individual committed a crime,
that the surveillance will produce information about that offense,
that normal investigative procedures have failed and that the
communication under surveillance is connected with the offense.' 37 Therefore, a user of a device containing the Clipper
Chip will be afforded the same protections now possessed by more
traditional communications devices.
Moreover, if the government does intercept a communication
subject to Title III, such action would not violate the provision's
minimization requirement.'38 All communications where the
Clipper Chip is used will be encrypted. It follows that in most
circumstances the intercepted communication will contain material unrelated to any alleged illegal activity. 39 This is no different

135. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4).
136. E-mail is electronic mail sent through a computer. Anne Meredith Fulton,
Comment, Cyberspace and the Internet: Who will be the Privacy Police?, 3
COMMLAW CONSPEcTUs 63, 63 n.3 (1995).

137. See supra notes 108-19 and accompanying text for a discussion of the requirements for a Title III surveillance.
138. The minimization requirement states that law enforcement agents must
minimize the recording of electronic surveillance to related matters. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 130 (1978). See supra notes 120-29 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the minimization requirement.
139. Since the Clipper Chip is merely a means of scrambling and unscrambling
communications, the device would not be able to differentiate between related and
unrelated matters and it is possible a large ratio of unrelated matters will be acquired. ChippingAway, supra note 42, at Al.
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than what normally occurs with interception of telephone communications with a wiretap and any material obtained is judged
under the circumstances of the acquisition.
Unlike most intercepted telephone communications, the fact
that the communication is encrypted will not permit a law enforcement agent to simultaneously minimize the communication
because the message will have to be recorded in its entirety and
then decoded. However, an encrypted communication is in effect
in code and, as such, falls under the simultaneous minimization
exception to Title 111.14' Accordingly, law enforcement may postpone minimization if the intercepted communication is in
code.' 4 ' Thus, users of devices containing the Clipper Chip will
possess the same protections as those afforded to users of established communications devices.
IV.

ALTERNATIVES TO THE CLIPPER CHIP

Although the Clipper Chip is a sound proposal with statutory
safeguards, the Clinton Administration is succumbing to opposition of the Clipper Chip and is considering alternatives to the
Clipper Chip proposal.14 The two primary alternatives are the
Commercial Key Escrow and the Flag Card systems.
The Commercial Key Escrow system is based on computer
software instead of hardware like the Clipper Chip." When a
message is encrypted under the Commercial Key Escrow system,
the designer of the encryption technology creates a private key
which is deposited in a "data recover center" (a trusted, non-governmental third party) and a public key for the sender of the message.'" If law enforcement authorities desire to obtain the contents of a message, they must obtain a warrant, record the message and then use the identification of the data recovery center
message to obtain the private key to unscramble
contained in 1the
45
the message.
Another alternative under consideration is the Flag Card
system. In the Flag Card system, every national government
would issue computer hardware in the form of a chip called a Flag
Card with that nation's cryptographic policy.' 41 Users could

140. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5).
141. Id.
142. John Markoff, U.S. to Urge a New Policy on Software, N. Y. TIMES, Aug. 18,
1995, at Dl. The Clinton Administration stated that it would soon propose an
alternative to the Clipper Chip. Id.
143. Peter H. Lewis, International Technology; Between a Hacker and a Hard
Place, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1995, at D1.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Jill Gambon, The Business of Security - The Demise of Clipper Opens up
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scramble their messages with any encryption technologies on the
Flag Card.'47 Network security servers appointed by government
agencies would then police the system.'48
Neither the Commercial Key Escrow nor Flag Card systems
are superior to the Clipper Chip proposal. Neither alternative
guarantees that the government could easily apprehend criminals. 149 While the government holds the decoder keys in the
Clipper Chip proposal and does not in either the Commercial Key
Escrow or Flag Card systems, the advantages of the alternatives
are neutralized because law enforcement authorities have the
same access to all three systems with a court order. Furthermore,
private citizens have the same protections under Title III with all
three systems whether or not the government or private companies hold the decoder keys. Therefore, the government should
implement the Clipper Chip proposal to achieve its stated objectives and not abandon it because of unfounded fears.
CONCLUSION .

Encryption technology has the ability to provide private citizens with the most privacy protection since the Industrial Revolution. However, it is difficult to achieve a balance between privacy
and security.'5 ° Where the nature of encryption technology is to
provide privacy protection, criminals will use encryption technology to stymie law enforcement from conducting electronic surveillance.
The Clipper Chip is only an attempt to keep up with the
current pace of technology. The Clipper Chip proposal explicitly
mandates safeguard procedures to prevent renegade government
agencies from conducting warrantless searches and seizures. Additionally, courts will find the Clipper Chip falls under the jurisdiction of Title III. Therefore, law enforcement authorities intercepting communications using the Clipper Chip will be subjected
to the procedures required in Title III and private citizens will
have the protections afforded by Title III. Thus, the government is
barred from admitting in court communications obtained without
a warrant.
It is commonly accepted that the current system for wiretap-

Encryption Technology Market, INFORMATIONWEEK, Apr. 10, 1995, at 64.
147. Elizabeth Corcoran, Talk Like an Encryption: In a Coding Technology Debate that pits U.S. Against Business, 3 Firms Propose Answers, WASH. POST, Mar.
16, 1995, at Bll.
148. Gambon, supra note 146, at 64.
149. Corcoran, supra note 147, at Bll.
150. See Government Issues, supra note 5, at 4. The Clipper Chip Initiative
strikes a balance between the legitimate needs of law enforcement and national
security with the needs of business and private individuals. Id.
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ping is not an unreasonable invasion of privacy if a warrant is
obtained prior to an electronic surveillance. The Clipper Chip will
not provide the government with any more power to pry into individual private lives than the current system for wiretapping provides. It is only a device to maintain the current level of wiretapping ability law enforcement agencies have at their disposal. The
Clipper Chip is not Orwellian;5 it is merely a product of the
evolution of the Technological Age.
Howard S. Dakoff

151. See GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 5 (1949). 1984 is a fictional book depicting the
future of civilization where individuals have absolutely no privacy from the government. Id. This book originated the now famous quote: "Big Brother is watching
you." Id.

